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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether a price-concentration relationship can be found on local 
cinema markets in Germany. First, we test a model of monopolistic pricing using a new set of 
German micro data and find no significant difference in admission prices on monopoly and 
oligopoly markets. In a next step, we test whether this can be explained by the existence of 
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operators might explain our observations. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a well-established empirical insight of industrial organization research that a higher 
number of competing suppliers for a homogeneous good leads to lower prices on the market. 
At least since the seminal contribution of Weiss (1989), price-concentration studies have been 
established in economic literature and applied in antitrust assessments of many merger cases. 
A huge empirical literature confirms the price-concentration relationship for a range of 
different industries. For instance, Brewer and Jackson (2006), Cyrnak and Hannan (1999), 
Hannan (1992), Hannan and Liang (1993), Kozak (2008), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), and 
Xie (2007) study the banking industry, and Borenstein (1989), (1990), Brueckner et al. 
(1992), Evans and Kessides (1993), Kim and Singal (1993), Morrison and Winston (1990), 
and Singal (1996) study airlines. To avoid problems related to differentiated products, 
especially the degree of substitutability, most price-concentration studies focus on markets for 
“sufficiently homogeneous” goods (see, e.g., the examples in the recent comprehensive 
literature surveys by Newmark (2006) and Pautler (2003)). Cross-section analyses may be 
conducted using different industries, but more frequently geographically separated markets 
within the same industry are used. For instance, the aforementioned literature on airlines 
analyzes specific flight routes. This paper studies the German movie theater industry, 
focusing on mainstream movies. 
With a gross turnover of only €757.9 million (Berauer (2008)), the movie theater industry is a 
rather small part of the German economy. Nevertheless, almost every small city has at least 
one movie theater, and despite more or less continuously declining ticket sales over the last 
six decades, an average of 1.52 cinema visits per capita in 2007 (Berauer (2008)) makes going 
to the movies still an important leisure activity. 
Existing studies on the movie theater industry usually use macro data and try to identify a 
cinema demand function. As economic intuition suggests, price and income are the most 
important determinants of demand. However, estimated price elasticites vary widely across 
different studies. In the short run, Cameron (1986) finds a price elasticity of 0.8, Sisto and 
Zanola (2005) estimate 0.37, and Dessy and Gambaro (2008) estimate 0.27. Long-run 
elasticities are generally higher (in absolute terms) and estimated to be 2.25 (Dewenter and 
Westermann (2005)), 3.51 (Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino (1997)), and 0.8 (Sisto and 
Zanola (2005)). 
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Income elasticities vary between 0.9 (Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino (1997)) and 0.37 
(Dessy and Gambaro (2008)) in the short run, and between 4.48 (Dewenter and Westermann 
(2005)) and 1.55 (Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino (1997)) in the long run. These 
differences are most likely caused by cultural factors, as those studies use data from different 
countries and per capita ticket sales vary widely across different countries (Dewenter and 
Westermann (2005)). 
In addition, cinema demand is determined by some product-specific factors, especially by the 
existence of close subsitutes. Cameron (1986) uses UK macro time-series data and finds a 
significant negative impact of TV set diffusion on cinema demand, which means that TV 
must be seen as a substitute for cinema. Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino (1997) confirm 
this for Spain, and Dewenter and Westermann (2005) for Germany. Sisto and Zanola (2005), 
on the other hand use, Italian data and find a positive influence of TV, meaning that TV might 
as well be a complement to cinema. Dewenter and Westermann (2005) find a significant 
substitutive relationship between theater (including opera) and cinema. 
This leads to a more general question: What is a substitute for cinema? If going to the cinema 
is only about watching a movie, then TV or a DVD is a substitute. But since the price of 
watching TV is the same in all parts of Germany and almost every German household has at 
least one TV set (Dewenter and Westermann (2005)), the constant term will control for this in 
a cross-section analysis. If going to the cinema is about going out on a Saturday night, then 
there are lots of other possible activities with various prices. Fernández Blanco and Baños 
Pino (1997) try to control for this by incorporating the average wage per hour as the price of 
all other substitutes, but find no significant influence. However, the number of available 
leisure activities will certainly be positively correlated with the size of the local market. 
Therefore, controlling for the number of inhabitants indirectly reflects the availability of 
substitutes. 
In the present paper, we focus on whether a price-concentration relationship can be found in 
the German movie theater industry. Comparable studies were done for other countries by 
Davis (2005) and Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006). Davis (2005) uses data of the US movie 
theater industry to directly estimate the price as a function of several market and competition 
variables. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) develop a model that simultaneously explains 
market structure and prices, and test it using UK data. We try to confirm their findings, but 
extend the methodology by modeling optimal pricing behavior in the monopoly case. We 
calibrate this model using micro data from actual monopoly markets and use this calibrated 
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model to predict monopoly prices in oligopoly markets. If there actually is an effect of market 
concentration on prices, we will expect to find significantly lower prices on oligopoly markets 
than our calibrated monopoly model predicts. If, however, we do not find such a relationship, 
further investigation will be required to identify the reasons for the missing price effect. 
2. The Model 
In the following section we will develop a simple model to describe the price-setting behavior 
of a monopolistic cinema operator. We assume that there are n spatially separated monopoly 
markets and the cinema operator on market k is facing a local cinema demand that can be 
described by1 
(1)    642 531 kkkkk NpIpD , 
where Ik is the local (per capita) income, pk is the admission price, Nk is the number of local 
inhabitants, and 1 to 6 are parameters.2 Since the major part of the costs for maintenance, 
heating, etc., is independent of the number of viewers, we impose fixed costs F, while 
variable costs, in line with Macmillan and Smith (2001), are assumed to be zero. In addition, 
each cinema operator has to pay license fees to movie distributors that consist of a fixed and a 
variable component. The fixed amount is part of F, while the variable amount is a share (t) of 
their box-office revenues. 
Each cinema operator is maximizing her profit . Hence, the optimization problem (2) of a 
monopolistic operator is  
(2)  FtNpIpFtpDp
p
11max 642 531 , 
and the monopoly price p1 can be described by 
(3)     4
62
34
51
1 )1(
NIp , 
with a resulting demand y* that is given by 
(4)     62 51
4
4
1
* NIy . 
                                                 
1 Cameron (1986) uses a similar additive demand function. When estimating demand functions, often isoelastic 
demand functions are preferred. We do not use an isoelastic demand function, because it generates corner 
solutions for the optimal monopoly price that do not correspond with real-world observations at all. 
2 For simplicity, the index k is omitted for the rest of the paper. 
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In the case that the optimal cinema demand y* exceeds the operator’s cinema capacity K, 
which is assumed to be given and fixed, the operator will charge a higher price p2, so that the 
available capacity is just exhausted. Thus, for y*  K we obtain 
(5)    4
62
3
51
22
NIKpKpD , 
and the optimal price p* of a monopolistic cinema operator can be finally described by the 
pricing rule 
(6)    
.*for
*,for
)1(
*
4
62
4
62
3
51
34
51
yKNIK
yKNI
p  
Since the optimal price as determined by (6) is independent of t, the price-setting behavior is 
not distorted by the variable part of the license fee. The pricing rule deduced here will be used 
later to estimate values for parameters 1 to 6. It is easy to verify that the price elasticity in 
the optimum with a nonbinding capacity constraint equals 1. 
3. The Data 
For the US movie theater market, Davis (2005, 2006a, 2006b) is able to exploit exhaustive 
time-series data on a disaggregated basis. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) can use similar 
time-series data from the UK Competition Commission. Time-series data on the German 
movie theater industry is available only on a highly aggregated level (Berauer (2008)) that is 
unsuitable for our purposes. Hence, cross-sectional data was collected from scratch in August 
2008. In a first step, we identified areas that constitute geographically separated markets for 
cinema demand. Large integrated areas cause several types of problems in the data collection, 
for instance regarding the appropriate number of inhabitants that will be used to describe 
market size. Take Berlin for instance: As a customer would need up to two hours to get from 
the north to the south of the city, it is rather unlikely that a cinema in the north and a cinema 
in the south compete on the same market. Hence, the data set should contain only the northern 
or the southern population to describe the market. This creates two problems: First, there is 
the question of where exactly the borders of the catchment area are. In densely populated 
areas like Berlin, a slight change in the definition of the catchment area can easily cause large 
changes in the “appropriate” number of inhabitants in the market. Second, often data is only 
available on the city level, so in a lot of cases, the appropriate data would be unavailable. The 
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same holds for areas like Rhein-Main and the Ruhr, where cities are more or less seamlessly 
connected by densely populated commuter belts.3 
Having identified 65 suitable areas4, we collected data on the number of inhabitants and per 
capita income. Since there was no central data source available at the required aggregation 
level, data on the former was taken from and matched with different sources, like the Federal 
Statistical Office, Wikipedia, and city or community websites as of December 2007. For the 
same reason, data on the latter was taken from various sources, including State Statistical 
Offices and city and community websites. The data consists of the values for the year 2005.5 
For each city the number of cinemas was identified by performing a search for “[city name], 
kino” on Google Maps. The result was matched with information from 
http://www.meinestadt.de, an Internet portal that offers comprehensive information about 
almost every city and region in Germany. Our study focuses on mainstream movie theaters, so 
art houses, drive-ins, and other cinemas have been ignored because of their lack of 
homogeneity with mainstream cinema. Furthermore, only cinemas featuring a certain up-to-
date portfolio of movies have been selected for the sample. Data on entry fees, capacities, and 
owners was collected using the cinemas’ websites. Similarly to Beckert and Mazzarotto 
(2006), entry fees for a common6 Saturday 8 p.m. show were identified. In case of 
differentiated prices depending on the type of seat (e.g., front row, back row, loge), the 
median price category was chosen. Capacity is measured by the number of seats the cinema 
provides, which according to Dewenter and Westermann (2005) is a more appropriate 
measure than the number of screens. For multiplexes (which almost all the cinemas were), the 
sum of seats for all screens was taken. 
The total sample consists of 108 cinema locations from 65 distinct areas. An average cinema 
charges an admission price of €7.10 and has a capacity of 1,456 seats. An average area has 
172,184 inhabitants with an average annual income of €16,507 per capita (Table 1). Note that 
the values of price and capacity as given in Table 1 are calculated on the level of the 
individual cinema location, while values of inhabitants and income are on an area basis, 
which leads to the different numbers of observations in the last column. 
                                                 
3 Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) seem to have run into similar difficulties. They excluded the London area, “as it 
is considered to have very different market features compared to those prevailing in the rest of England” (p. 9). 
4 Most areas are monocentric around a city. 
5 More recent data was available only for a few areas. To keep the data set consistent, the 2005 values were used. 
6 German movie theaters usually charge extra for extra-long performances. “Common” means that the movie is 
not extra-long. 
 6
Variable Mean SD Min Max No. of obs. 
Price 7.10 0.56 5.00 8.00 108 
Capacity 1455 770 203 3390 108 
Inhabitants 172184 131678 14500 655000 65 
Avg. income 16507 1972 13837 21804 65 
Table 1: Description of the sample – all markets included 
The analysis in the following section requires the data to be aggregated on the area level. 
Furthermore, the sample needs to be split into monopoly and oligopoly areas. To do so, we 
use the (directly observable) information on cinema operators. An area with only one cinema 
operator, even if she runs several locations within this area, is considered to be a monopoly. 
Table 2 presents some descriptive information on the monopoly subsample, which consists of 
42 observations. In the case of one owner with multiple locations in one area, capacities are 
summed over all locations.7 
Variable Mean SD Min Max No. of obs. 
Price 7.18 0.50 6.00 8.00 42 
Capacity 1396 744 447 4091 42 
Inhabitants 111997 75694 14500 360000 42 
Avg. income 16312 2042 13837 21804 42 
Table 2: Description of the sample – monopoly markets only 
In the case of more than one cinema operator, the area is considered to be an oligopoly. To 
obtain per area data, the number of seats is summed over all cinemas in an area. Admission 
prices are calculated as the capacity-weighted average of all locations in the area. Table 3 
shows the descriptive data of this subsample, which consists of 23 observations. 
Variable Mean SD Min Max No. of obs. 
Price 7.23 0.29 6.66 8.00 23 
Capacity 4192 1917 1639 9030 23 
Inhabitants 282091 140870 88000 655000 23 
Avg. income 16865 1784 14071 19990 23 
Table 3: Description of the sample – oligopoly markets only 
                                                 
7 In all those cases, admission prices are identical across locations. 
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As can be seen by comparing Tables 2 and 3, oligopoly markets are on average more than two 
and a half times as large as monopoly markets, while the average (aggregated) capacity on 
oligopoly markets is around three times larger than on monopoly markets. Hence, the relative 
capacity (number of seats per inhabitant) is rather similar in the two cases (0.0138 for 
monopolies and 0.0152 for oligopolies). 
In a last step, data on competition was gathered. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) consider the 
driving time to the next cinema as the appropriate measure. We convert their measure into 
distance with a rough calculation and find that their maximum radius is some 18 km.8 Since 
actual driving time heavily depends on the means of transportation used, we prefer to follow 
Davis (2005), who uses linear distance from the cinema. He states that in the USA “few 
customers drive more than 20 miles to the cinema” (p. 26), which is roughly 32 km. We 
included cinemas up to 20 km linear distance from the cinema considered, which is between 
the limits used in Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) and in Davis (2005). This suits the usual 
geographic layout of a city with a lot of small towns around. We consider these areas to be 
agglomerations equipped with roads and public transportation. Traveling out of an 
agglomeration will require more time and cause more inconvenience than traveling within the 
agglomeration. For that reason, a local market is very unlikely to exceed the borders of the 
area. 
4. Empirical Results 
In section 2, we developed a simple monopoly model and deduced a pricing rule for a 
monopolistic cinema operator (equation (6)). We will now use the monopoly data described in 
Table 2 to estimate the parameters 1 to 6 of equation (6). As (6) is a branched function, 
standard OLS technique cannot be applied. Instead we do a nonlinear least squares regression 
(NLS) and obtain the results presented in Table 4. NLS is an iterative procedure that fits the 
parameter values of a model so that they minimize the sum of the squared residuals. The NLS 
algorithms used9 are unable to estimate all parameters simultaneously. Hence, we select 
starting values and estimate only some of the parameters, while keeping others fixed at their 
starting values. Iteratively, we alternate fixed and estimated parameters, replacing the starting 
values with the estimated parameters of previous iterations. This way, we are able to obtain 
                                                 
8 Beckert and Mazzarotto (2006) consider a 20-minute ride to the next cinema as the upper bound for a 
competitive effect. Assuming that the route from one cinema to the next is straight, and assuming that the 
average traveling speed is 50 km/h (the statutory inner-city speed limit in Germany), this yields a maximum 
distance of 18 km. Since the road is unlikely to be a long straightaway and hurdles like traffic lights cause the 
inner-city average speed to be way below 50 km/h, a 20-minute ride actually covers a shorter distance. 
9 The “nls” package of the statistics software R features the Gauss-Newton, Golub-Pereyra, and NL2SOL 
algorithms with Gauss-Newton as default. Our results are robust with respect to the different algorithms. 
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the set of parameters, presented in Table 4, that seem to fit our monopoly data best. Since the 
degrees of freedom and hence the significance levels depend on how many parameters are 
kept fixed, we do not give the significance levels of the parameters here. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value 
1  15.815 3  19.774 5  1121.659 
2  0.378 4  1.44 6  0.022 
Residual sum of squares: 11.36 
Table 4: NLS estimations of the monopoly model parameters10 
As expected, the admission price has a negative influence on demand. The resulting average 
price elasticity of demand at p* and the price elasticity at sample means are both about 1. 
Thus, we can conclude that the capacity of a cinema is usually not a binding restriction, which 
is in line with real observations.11  
Interestingly, the number of inhabitants, N, does not seem to have an influence on the price. 
The parameter 6, the exponent of N, is almost zero. This means that the multiplicative 
coefficient of N, 5, yields an almost constant term, because it is multiplied by a factor almost 
equal to 1. This can be explained by the fact that a higher market size is usually connected 
with higher capacities, so that the ratio of inhabitants to capacity is almost constant for all 
markets.12 
Since our data set shows a correlation coefficient of 0.35 between the number of inhabitants 
and per capita income, our individual coefficient estimations might be affected by 
multicollinearity. To ensure that our estimates do not suffer from multicollinearity problems, 
we compute the condition number of our coefficient matrix as proposed by Belsley et al. 
(1980). We find that the condition number is smaller than the critical value, so that the level 
of multicollinearity is acceptable. 
By inserting the estimated values for 1 to 6 as presented in Table 4 into the pricing rule (6), 
we obtain the calibrated pricing rule, referred to as (c6) in the following. In order to identify 
competitive effects, we use (c6) to compute hypothetical monopoly prices for the oligopoly 
                                                 
10 The parameter estimates are robust to jackknife resampling. Graphical inspection shows that the residuals are 
homoskedastic. 
11 The average load in 2005 was just 12.3%, with only slight differences between multiplexes (12.6–12.8%) and 
smaller sites (11.1–11.9%) (Schultz and Beigel (2006)). 
12 See section 3, page 7.  
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areas described in Table 3. Then we pool the data sets of monopoly and oligopoly areas. A 
potential competitive price effect on oligopoly markets would now be revealed if observed 
prices and hypothetical monopoly prices significantly differed on these markets. To test this, 
we use a regression model of the form 
QUAD4TRI2DUO2hyp1obs DDDpp , 
where pobs denotes the observed price, while DDUO to DQUAD are dummy variables for markets 
with two, three, and four cinema operators, respectively.13 If the observation is an oligopoly, 
phyp denotes the hypothetical monopoly price. If it is a monopoly, phyp denotes the estimated 
price, implicitly obtained in the NLS estimation described above. Table 5 shows the 
regression results. 
Parameter Value Standard Error p-value 
1  0.99945 0.01035 
16102  
2  0.06339 0.14523 0.664 
3  0.04699 0.22850 0.838 
4  0.31366 0.28867 0.282 
Table 5: Estimated effect of competition 
As expected, the parameter of the hypothetical monopoly price, 1, is highly significant at the 
0.1% level and its value is almost equal to one. The influence of the dummy variables 2, 3, 
and 4, however, is insignificant in all cases. Therefore, the observed prices on oligopoly 
markets are sufficiently explained by the hypothetical prices derived from (c6). Since there is 
no significant price effect of oligopoly markets, we can conclude that the observed prices on 
oligopoly markets are on the same level as the prices on monopoly markets. 
There are several explanations for this, one of which is collusive behavior among the cinema 
operators on oligopoly markets. Another explanation is that competition among cinema 
operators is weak or even impossible due to transportation costs. In this case, each cinema 
operator would act as a local monopolist. In order to rule out this explanation, we will analyze 
the effects of distance in the next section of this paper. 
                                                 
13 As a robustness check, DDUO, DTRI, and DQUAD were replaced by DOLIGOPOLY = DDUO + DTRI + DQUAD. 
Furthermore, instead of dummies, the number of cinema operators was used. Both alternative specifications 
yield the same qualitative result as the one presented in Table 5. 
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5. The Effects of Distance and Additional Capacity 
Davis (2005) measures the effect of market concentration on admission prices for US 
cinemas. He finds that alternative or additional supply in the same geographic area influences 
ticket prices negatively. The negative effect decreases (in absolute terms) with increasing 
distance from the cinema. He uses the number of screens to measure supply and differentiates 
between screens owned by the same company and screens owned by other (rival) companies. 
To take account of the distance between cinema locations, he uses 15 categories, starting with 
the number of screens at distances 0–0.5 miles, 0.5–1 mile, and so on, incrementing in 1-mile 
steps until 10 miles and then incrementing in 5-mile steps until he reaches a maximum linear 
distance of 30 miles from the location. We will use a similar approach and estimate the 
dependence of the price on market size and supply. 
Based on each cinema location i, the additional supply was determined by measuring the 
number of seats, CAP, available at other locations within the same area j.14 Own and rival 
seats were distinguished and categorized by their distance. Since using 15 categories – as in 
Davis (2005) – would have resulted in lack of data variation (as most values would have been 
zero), we used only three categories: 0–1 km (very close), 1–5 km (close), and 5–20 km 
(distant) linear distance from the cinema. To control for market-specific effects, the model 
specification includes the number of inhabitants, INHAB, in the area as a measure for market 
size, and the annual per capita income, INC, as a measure for consumer income, as suggested 
by Newmark (2006). Although one might expect a positive influence of a cinema’s market 
power on its charged price, measures of market concentration have been omitted from the 
specification to avoid endogeneity problems (Evans et al. (1993), Newmark (2006)). 
Controlling for quality is appealing, too: Cinema size might have been used as a quality 
indicator as well as the range of available films or the number of screens (Cameron (1990)). 
While multiplex cinemas perhaps offer a large variety of different movies, smaller cinemas 
might be more homelike. Customers might perceive either the one or the other as superior 
quality. Hence, the expected effect is ambiguous, and the sign of the coefficient would have 
been interesting to observe. Different quality, however, is a variable controlled by the single 
firm; thus it is endogenous as well (Newmark (2006)) and is omitted from our specification. 
Furthermore, the effect of quality differences should be minimal in our case, since the sample 
was selected with the homogeneity of the good in mind. Last but not least, cost differences 
might be an explanation for price differences. This is closely related to the quality issues 
                                                 
14 Note that the object of observation now is the cinema location, whereas in the previous section it was the 
geographical market. 
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mentioned above. For instance, a downtown cinema might have to pay a higher rent than a 
greenfield cinema. However, costs resulting from strategic decisions like location and quality 
choice must be seen as endogenous and have to be omitted from the specification (Newmark 
(2006)). 
We use OLS to estimate the model 
ijijjji CAPINCINHABP 3210, , 
where i,j represent the i-th cinema that operates in the j-th area. We expect the coefficient of 
INHAB to be positive, because – ceteris paribus – an increase in the number of inhabitants 
implies an increase in market size, which implies an increase in demand. The expected effect 
of INC is ambiguous, because an increase in income might either increase demand or enable 
consumers to pursue more expensive leisure activities, which would decrease cinema demand. 
CAPi in general is the capacity of all other cinema locations within the same area. We refine 
CAPi by disentangling it regarding distance and/or ownership (specifications 1–3). In general, 
all CAP coefficients should be negative, because increased supply ceteris paribus causes 
lower prices. If transportation costs were important, we would expect – in absolute terms – 
smaller coefficients for distant (close) capacity than for close (very close) capacity. To form 
an expectation for the effect of ownership, we need to take a closer look at the data. Having 
no rival capacity means that the observation is a monopoly market. If there is rival capacity, 
the observation will be an oligopoly market. However, some monopoly owners have several 
locations within the same area. Hence, we would expect own capacity to represent the ceteris 
paribus price-lowering effect of increased supply. Rival capacity should also incorporate this 
effect. In addition, the rival capacity coefficient should also contain the price-lowering effect 
of competition in oligopoly markets. Hence, we expect the coefficient of rival capacity to be 
more negative than the coefficient of own capacity. Table 6 shows estimation and test results. 
Ramsey’s RESET test shows that we do not have to reject our model specifications as 
incorrect. However, as in Davis (2005), the adjusted R2 signals that we explain only a little of 
the observed variance. This might be because of the omitted variables or because of other 
(unknown) market-specific factors driving the demand for cinema. Since we are not interested 
in a detailed exploration of the demand function or the price formula, but in the competition 
effects, the low R2 is acceptable in this case. 
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Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Intercept 6.683*** (0.4928) 
6.713*** 
(0.4338) 
6.691*** 
(0.4346) 
INHAB 2.884e 06*** (7.532e 07) 
2.923e 06*** 
(6.829e 07) 
2.967e 06*** 
(6.807e 07) 
INC 9.295e 06 (2.952e 05) 
7.525e 06 
(2.826e 05) 
8.612e 06 
(2.808e 05) 
CAP (own; 0–1 km) 1.993e 04 . (1.174e 04)   
CAP (own; 1–5 km) 2.615e 04 . (1.541e 04)   
CAP (own; 5–20 km) 1.241e 04 (1.518e 04)   
CAP (rival; 0–1 km) 1.450e 04 (1.298e 04)   
CAP (rival; 1–5 km) 2.124e 04** (7.424e 05)   
CAP (rival; 5–20 km) 2.105e 04*** (5.278e 05)   
CAP (pooled; 0–1 km)  1.787e 04* (7.680e 05)  
CAP (pooled; 1–5 km)  2.172e 04** (6.287e 05)  
CAP (pooled; 5–20 km)  2.130e 04*** (5.130e 05)  
CAP (own; pooled)   2.015e 04*** (5.054e 05) 
CAP (rival; pooled)   2.162e 04*** (5.316e 05) 
R2 0.1744 0.1703 0.1689 
Adj. R2 0.1077 0.1296 0.1366 
F (p-value) 0.01225 0.001682 0.0007055 
RESET (p-value) 0.1367 0.1414 0.122 
Breusch-Pagan (p-value) 0.1714 0.05667 0.02396 
Significance codes: *** p 0001; ** 0.001<p 0.01; * 0.01<p 0.05; else 0.05<p 0.1. 
Standard deviation given in parenthesis. 
Table : Influence of distance and ownership on ticket price15 
As expected, under all specifications the coefficient of INHAB is significantly positive, the 
coefficient of INC is positive, but insignificant, and the coefficients of CAP are negative. As 
the marginal effect of one additional seat is small, we will get more demonstrative values by 
multiplying the coefficients of Table 6 by 1000. Imagine the values given in the following as 
the price effect of a cinema with 1000-seat capacity in the category considered. 
                                                 
15 The Breusch-Pagan test showed that homoskedasticity of the error terms must be rejected for specifications 2 
and 3. Hence, the standard deviation has been calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 
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Under specification 1, CAP is distinguished by the owner as well as by the distance from the 
cinema, which results in six different CAP variables. All variables have the expected sign, but 
only the coefficients for close (for distant) rival capacity are significant at the 1% (the 0.1%) 
level. Note that the two coefficients are almost equal ( 0.21€), and note further that the 
weakly significant coefficients of very close and close own capacities are of the same 
magnitude as well. 
Specification 2 distinguishes distance categories only. If transportation costs played a role, we 
would expect the coefficients to decrease (in absolute terms) with distance. Our estimation 
results ( 0.18€, 0.22€, and 0.21€) indicate, however, that distance has no effect on the 
price. This contradicts the results of Davis (2005), who finds the negative effect to be 
decreasing (in absolute terms) with increasing distance. It seems that transportation costs are 
so small that they do not matter or customers ignore them. In this case, the local-monopolist 
hypothesis does not hold. 
Specification 3 pools all distance categories, thus distinguishing only own and rival seats. The 
regression yields significant coefficients of similar value for both own ( 0.20€) and rival 
( 0.22€) capacity. This is contrary to our expectations, but in line with the results of Davis 
(2005). The coefficients of specification 2 are almost equal, so that it does not seem to make a 
difference for prices who owns the additional capacity. As mentioned above, rival capacity 
only exists on oligopoly markets, while some monopolists operate more than one cinema in 
an area. Hence, the coefficient of own capacity should be smaller in absolute terms than the 
coefficient of rival capacity, as the latter should reduce the monopoly price markup. 
6. Conclusions 
In section 4, we tried to find a price-concentration relationship by applying the monopoly 
model on our data set. We did not find a significant effect of the number of operators on the 
observed admission price. One possible explanation for such a result might have been the 
existence of local monopolies, caused by transportation costs. In this case, we would expect to 
find significantly lower prices for rival cinemas in close neighborhood, with the price effect 
decreasing (in absolute terms) for more distant rival locations. However, in section 5 we do 
not find any hint on such an effect. Within an area, transportation costs do not seem to play a 
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significant role for market power. Nevertheless, transportation costs might of course influence 
the total demand on the market.16 
Another explanation for the observed results might be collusive behaviour of the cinema 
operators. The empirical test of our theoretical model from section 2 does not show any 
significant difference between prices on monopoly and oligopoly markets, which might be 
seen as a hint of an implicit or explicit agreement to charge monopoly prices. This 
interpretation is supported by our findings from section 5, in which we find coefficients of the 
same size for own and rival capacity. If there were competition, we would expect a greater 
coefficient (in absolute terms) for rival capacity, because it incorporates the effects both of 
increased supply and of competition, while own capacity only incorporates the effect of 
increased supply. 
From a theoretical point of view, there are some hints that collusion on prices in the movie 
theater industry might be feasible: First, prices are easily and inexpensively observable; hence 
deviation of one operator would be detected easily. Second, capacity is fixed in the short run, 
and long-run capacity changes can be observed easily and at low cost as well. Third, 
punishment threats might be very effective, because most cinema operators are large 
multiplex chains that compete on a lot of local markets. Deviation in one market might be 
punished on many other markets. 
One important shortcoming of our study is that cinema revenue does not consist of box-office 
revenues only. One other source of revenues is advertisement in movie theaters. In 2007, a 
total of €106.2 million was spent for such commercial activities in Germany (Berauer (2008)). 
From this perspective, a cinema operates on a two-sided market. On the one hand it sells 
tickets; on the other hand it sells advertising space. The value of its advertising space depends 
on the number of customers that visit the location, that is, the number of tickets sold. By 
reducing the ticket price below the one-market optimum, more tickets will be sold and more 
revenues from advertising will be generated. To develop and test a model of the cinema 
market as a two-sided market is the task of future research. 
Our simple theoretical model ignores revenues from selling complementary goods like 
popcorn, drinks, and ice cream. The interesting point in this case is that selling these goods 
                                                 
16 Travel costs will most likely only differ in the time needed to reach the location. For instance, bus tickets are 
usually equally priced for all possible routes within a city area. Car users experience marginal costs of each 
additional kilometer traveled, but empirically car use is rather inelastic to the price, so a few kilometers more 
or less might not influence the consumer’s decision making significantly. 
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causes variable costs, but unlike admission prices, the receipts do not have to be shared with 
the distributor. Hence, cinema operators might charge lower entry fees to attract more 
customers, increasing receipts in, e.g., popcorn sales, or in other words, shifting turnover 
away from the shared box-office receipts to the nonshared complementary goods. In addition, 
price competition or collusion might take place with these goods as well. A recent theoretical 
contribution by Chen (2009) investigates this issue. 
Finally, price discrimination is common in movie theaters. Prices differ by day of the week, 
time of day, age, and employment status (e.g., through student rebates). Furthermore, second-
degree price discrimination (five for the price of four, or even flat rates) is very common. 
Empirical testing of a comprehensive model including advertising and complementary goods 
revenues and allowing for price discrimination might be the goal of future research. 
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